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CAN INTERNATIONAL LAW TRUMP
TRUMP'S IMMIGRATION AGENDA?
PROTECTING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
THROUGH PROCEDURAL JUS COGENS
S.I. Strong*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Donald Trump's approach to immigration has been revolutionary, to say
the least. In his short tenure in office, his policies banning travel of individuals
from certain Muslim countries have been taken to the United States Supreme
Court on two separate occasions, and his most recent technique of separating
children from their parents at the border has already spawned litigation.2 His
boldest proposal yet, however, involves the widespread denial of procedural
rights to immigrants.3 In his words, "[w]hen somebody comes in, we must immediately, with no Judges or Court Cases, bring them back from where they
came [sic]." 4
If implemented, this move will doubtless generate extensive constitutional
debate.5 Immigration proceedings are considered civil rather than criminal in
nature and must comply with traditional standards of due process.6 Still, the in-

* D.Phil., University of Oxford (U.K.); Ph.D. (law), University of Cambridge (U.K.); J.D., Duke University; M.P.W., University of Southern California; B.A., University of California, Davis. The author, who is
admitted to practice as an attorney in New York, Illinois and Missouri and as a solicitor in Ireland and in England and Wales, is the Manley 0. Hudson Professor of Law at the University of Missouri and Adjunct Professor at Georgetown Law Center.
1. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018); Trump v. International Refugee Assistance Project,
137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017) (concerning Executive Order 13780).

2. See Mrs. L v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE"), Case No. 18cv0428 DMS
(MDD), Order Granting in Part Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification (S.D. Cal. June 26, 2018).
3. See Philip Rucker & David Weigel, Trump Advocates Depriving Undocumented Immigrants of DueProcess Rights, WASH. POST (June 25, 2018), http://www.msn.com/en-us/news/politics/trump-advocates-

depriving-undocumented-immigrants-of-due-process-rights/ar-AAz62YF?ocid=ientp.
4.
Border

Katie Rogers & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Trump Calls for Depriving Immigrants Who Illegally Cross
of
Due
Process
Rights,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
24,
2018),

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/24/us/politics/trump-immigration-judges-due-process.html.
5.

Procedural due process has long been considered a critical component of U.S. constitutional law. See

ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 547 (3d ed. 2006).

6. See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953); In re M-A-M-, 25 I&N
Dec. 474, 479 (B.I.A. 2011).
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creasing politicization of constitutional law, as well as the tendency of a majority of the Supreme Court to, in Justice Sonia Sotomayor's words, "ignor[e]
the facts, misconstru[e] our legal precedent, and turn[] a blind eye to the pain
and suffering the [Trump policies] inflict[] upon countless families and individuals, many of whom are United States citizens," in immigration proceedings
suggests that alternate arguments should also be considered.
One intriguing option involves international law. Some people may question this approach, given the isolationist tendencies of various members of the
Supreme Court.8 Jenny Martinez has recognized, however, that "[e]ven the late
Justice Antonin Scalia, who argued so vociferously against the use of foreign
law in interpreting the U.S. Constitution, agreed that consideration of foreign
sources was relevant" in some circumstances. 9 Furthermore, international law
offers the possibility of both judicial and non-judicial relief. 10
This Essay therefore considers the applicability of certain peremptory
norms commonly referred to as jus cogens to the Administration's recent calls
to eliminate immigration hearings.11 The "norms are considered peremptory in
the sense that they are mandatory, do not admit derogation, and can be modified only by general international norms of equivalent authority." 12 Because
"[f]us cogens norms are often thought to be equivalent to constitutional principles of international law ...

,"

they are often referred to as "an international bill

of rights, or . .. are said to constitute the highest in a norms hierarchy." 13
The discussion begins in Section II by defining traditional and procedural
elements ofjus cogens, followed by an analysis in Section III of the content of
proceduraljus cogens. Next, Section IV considers how these principles might
operate with respect to the Administration's proposals to eliminate immigration
hearings. Notably, the recommendations outlined herein may apply equally to
other violations of procedural law, both in the immigration context and beyond.
Section V then concludes the discussion with certain forward-looking observations.
II.

TRADITIONAL AND PROCEDURAL JUS COGENS

The traditional conception ofjus cogens (sometimes referred to as ins cogens) involves a tightly circumscribed set of non-derogable norms applicable to
all states and "include[s], at a minimum, the prohibitions against genocide;
slavery or slave trade; murder or disappearance of individuals; torture or other

7. Trumpv. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2433 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
8. Jenny S. Martinez, Who's Afraid ofInternational and ForeignLaw?, 104 CAL. L. REV. 1579, 158485 (2016).
9. Id at 1584.
10. See infra notes 71-88 and accompanying text.
11. See Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens, 34 YALE J. INT'L L.
331, 332 (2009); S.I. Strong, GeneralPrinciplesofProceduralLaw and ProceduralJus Cogens, 122 PENN ST.
L. REV. 347, 394-98 (2018).
12. Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 11.
13.

LARRY MAY, GLOBAL JUSTICE AND DUE PROCESS 121 (2011).
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cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; prolonged arbitrary detention; systematic racial discrimination; and 'the principles of the United Nations Charter prohibiting the use of force."'14 These types of peremptory norms
are recognized in international instruments such as the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties15 as well as in domestic authorities such as the Restatement
(Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States. 16
Although most discussions about jus cogens focus on substantive rights,
peremptory norms can also be framed in procedural terms.17 Some commentators-such as those discussing the right to habeus corpus, state immunity,19
and access to justice 20 -have focused on specific procedures, whereas others
have made broader assertions and claimed that all human rights, including
those of both a substantive and procedural nature, can be considered peremptory in nature. 21
Determining which principles should rise to the level of jus cogens is a
challenging task. The current Essay adopts a test devised by Evan Criddle and
Evan Fox-Decent, who show a relationship between jus cogens and the rule of
law and suggest that a particular procedure "will count as jus cogens if respect
for it is indispensable to the state's ability to secure legality for the benefit of
all." 23
Skeptics may oppose this effort from the outset, based on language from
the United States Supreme Court suggesting that that "due process guarantees
and the right to a fair trial" are "derogable." 24 However, it appears likely that
this apparent paradox simply reflects a failure by the Court to distinguish between rights that are waivable by the parties (such as the right to an appeal or to
a fully reasoned decision) and rights that are not waivable by the parties (such
as the audiatur principle).25 Thus, certain rights (such as notice) may be non14. See Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 11, at 331-32 (footnote omitted).
15. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. Although the
United States has not yet ratified the Vienna Convention, U.S. courts routinely rely upon it. See, e.g., Abbott v.
Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983, 2007 n.11 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Sanchez-Llanas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331,
391 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Mora v. New York, 524 F.3d 183, 196 n.19 (2d Cir. 2008).
16.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§

102 cmt. k (AM.

LAW INST. 1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
17. See Strong, supra note 11, at 394.
18. See MAY, supra note 13, at 120.
19. See Sevrine Knuchel, State Immunity and the Promise of Jus Cogens, 9 Nw. J. INT'L HUM. RTS. 149,
160-61 (2011); Alexander Orakhelashvili, The Classification ofInternationalLegal Rules: A Reply to Stefan
Talmon, 26 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 89, 89-90 (2013); Stefan A.G. Talmon, Jus Cogens After Germany v Italy: Substantive and ProceduralRules Distinguished,25 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 979, 980 (2012).
20. See Christopher A. Whytock, ForeignState Immunity and the Right to CourtAccess, 93 B.U. L. REV.
2033, 2035 (2014).
21.

See ALEXANDER ORAKHELASHVLI, PEREMPTORY NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 59-60 (2008);

Stephen Gardbaum, Human Rights as InternationalConstitutionalRights, 19 EUR. J. INT'L L. 749, 757 (2008).
22. Part of the difficulty involves the link between jus cogens and customary international law. See
Strong, supra note 11, at 370-72.
23. Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 11, at 367.
24. Id. at 371 n.144 (citation omitted); see also M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 11
(1972); Nat'lEquip. Rentalv. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315-16 (1964).
25. See Strong, supra note 11, at 395-97.
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derogable (i.e., peremptory) by the state but waivable by the parties.26 Indeed,
scholars have recognized that "certain 'derogable' rights," including "due process guarantees and the right to fair trial," can nevertheless be peremptory in
nature. 27
Though important, the debate about waivable and non-waivable rights is
beyond the scope of the current Essay, which assumes that the procedural rights
that the current Administration has suggested eliminating are not rights that the
individual immigrants would agree to waive. The discussion will therefore turn
to issues relating to the content of procedural jus cogens.
III. CONTENT OF PROCEDURAL JUS COGENS

The largely undertheorized nature of procedural law in the United States
may make the process of determining the content of procedural jus cogens challenging for U.S. scholars and jurists.28 Part of the problem can be traced to
statements by the United States Supreme Court claiming that procedural due
process, "unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed
content unrelated to time, place and circumstances." 29 Instead, the Court has
characterized due process as a flexible concept that "calls for such procedural
protections as the particular situation demands." 30
While judges may appreciate the freedom associated with procedural flexibility, such an approach can be extremely problematic, since it allows courts to
violate individual rights based on nothing more than political expediency. 31Indeed, that is precisely the concern that exists with respect to the current Administration's approach to immigration proceedings.32
Difficulties may also arise because of a lack of familiarity in the United
States with procedures adopted by other legal systems.33 Commentators such as
Kevin Clermont, John Langbein, and Richard Marcus have long bemoaned the

26. See id.
26. Even when a particular procedure (such as notice) is waivable, states will often scrutinize those
choices carefully. See M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 11 (1972); Nat'1 Equip. Rental v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315-16 (1964).
27. ORAKHELASHVILI, supra note 21, at 60; see also Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 11, at 370-7 1;
Jenia lontcheva Turner, NationalizingInternationalCriminalLaw, 41 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 46 n.253 (2004).
28. Lawrence B. Solum, ProceduralJustice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 182-83 (2004).
29. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (quoting Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S.
886, 895 (1961)).
30. Id. at 334 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)).
31. Political expediency has been used to explain or justify a wide range of procedural due process violations in the United States. See, e.g., Jerry Kang, Denying Prejudice: Internment, Redress, and Denial, 51
UCLA L. REV. 933, 972 (2004); Micah Herzig, Note, Is Korematsu Good Law in the Face of Terrorism? ProceduralDue Process in the Security Versus Liberty Debate, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 685, 687-88 (2002).
32. See, e.g., Erik Larson & Kartikay Mehrota, Trump 's Immigration Crackdown Is Likely to Bring a
Flood ofLawsuits, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-02-22/trumps-immigration-crackdown-likely-to-bring-lawsuit-flood; HARVARD IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE CLINICAL
PROGRAM, THE IMPACT OF PRESIDENT TRUMP' S EXECUTIVE ORDERS ON ASYLUM SEEKERS 1 (May 2017).
33. See Kevin M. Clermont, IntegratingTransnationalPerspectives into Civil Procedure: What Not to
Teach, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 524, 530 (2006) (discussing "the parochialism that so affects U.S. procedure").
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lack of international and comparative perspectives in U.S. scholarship on procedural law, 34 and such analyses are critical to the determination ofjus cogens
35
norms.
While space restrictions preclude a comprehensive discussion of comparative and international procedure and the way those principles affect the
content of procedural jus cogens, such analyses do exist.36 As a result, it is possible to summarize the process briefly here so as to apply those conclusions to
the proposed U.S. policy involving immigration hearings.
According to Criddle and Fox-Decent, the general consensus is that "peremptory norms enter international law as 'general principles of law."' 37 General principles of law have long been recognized as a legitimate type of international law and are reflected in international instruments such as the Statute of
the International Court of Justice 38 and domestic authorities such as the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States. 39 Commentary (opiniojuris) is also central to the task of identifying general principles of law. 40 Perhaps the most important work in this area is Bin Cheng's
classic text, General Principles ofLaw as Applied by InternationalCourts and
Tribunals,41 which was updated in 2017 by Charles Kotuby and Luke Sobota. 42
General principles of law are derived through comparative analysis of
rules and practices, including "basic individual rights enshrined in municipal
constitutions, statutes, and judicial decisions." 44 In many ways, the methodology is not unlike that undertaken by the American Law Institute ("ALI") when
generating various Restatements and the ALI/UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure. 45 Identification of general principles of procedural
law, however, is not the same as simply compiling and comparing a list of indi-

34. See id.; John H. Langbein, The Influence ofComparative Procedurein the UnitedStates, 43 AM. J.
COMP. L. 545, 546 (1995); Richard L. Marcus, PuttingAmerican ProceduralExceptionalism into A Globalized
Context, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 709, 709, 740 (2005).
35. See infra notes 49-70 and accompanying text.
36. See Strong, supra note 11, at 390-403 (discussing authorities and deriving certain peremptory norms
of procedure).
37. Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 11, at 341.
38. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, ¶l(c).
39. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, § 102.
40. See Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 11, at 339.
41.

See generally BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS

AND TRIBUNALS (digital reprint 2006) (Stevens & Sons Ltd. 1953).
42.

See CHARLES

T. KOTUBY

JR.

&

LUKE A.

SOBOTA,

GENERAL PRINCPLES OF LAW AND

INTERNATIONAL DUE PROCESS: PRINCPLES AND NORMS APPLICABLE IN TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES xiii, 157-

202 (2017).
43. See Strong, supra note 11, at 371 (discussing the use of municipal law in deriving general customary
law, which is the basis of general principles of law); see also IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 52 (7th ed. 2008) (noting "collections of municipal cases" are critical to the "assessment
of the customary law").
44. Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 11, at 341.
45.

See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, CAPTURING THE VOICE OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE:

HANDBOOK FOR ALI REPORTERS AND THOSE WHO REVIEW THEIR WORK 3-6 (2d ed. 2015).
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vidual rules of national or international procedure.46 As Ronald Dworkin said, a
principle is a "standard that is to be observed, not because it will advance or secure an economic, political or social situation deemed desirable, but because it
is a requirement of justice or fairness or some other dimension of morality." 47
Another way of describing the distinction in the procedural realm is that general principles identify what is considered fair, whereas rules of procedure describe the tangible means of achieving that standard of fairness. 48
Because Kotuby and Sobota's analysis of general principles of international law is more recent than Cheng's, their conclusions will provide the
framework for the current discussion. According to Kotuby and Sobota, six
principles of procedure must exist if a tribunal is to provide a legitimate determination of a party's legal rights.49 First, the court must have jurisdiction over
the parties and the dispute, and the parties must have adequate notice of the
proceedings. 50 While arguments can arise over what constitutes "proper" jurisdiction and "proper" notice, the fundamental concept appears incontrovertible:
jurisdiction and notice must exist if the resulting decision is to be considered
final and binding.51 Indeed, as Laurence Solum has said,
[P]rocedural justice is deeply entwined with the old and powerful idea
that a process that guarantees rights of meaningful participation is an essential
prerequisite for the legitimate authority of action-guiding legal norms. Meaningful participation requires notice and opportunity to be heard, and it requires
a reasonable balance between cost and accuracy.52
The centrality of jurisdiction and notice to the adjudicative process suggests that both should be considered to constitute procedural jus cogens. This
conclusion is supported by Criddle and Fox-Decent's claim that "a norm will
count asjus cogens if respect for it is indispensable to the state's ability to secure legality for the benefit of all." 53
Kotuby and Sobota's second principle of international procedural law focuses on the impartiality and independence of the decisionmaker. 54 This principle has been extensively discussed in scholarly and judicial settings55 and is al46. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. and CIv. PROC. R. (Eng.) with AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE & UNIDROIT,
PRINCPLES OF TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL PROCEDURE (2004) [hereinafter ALI/UNIDROIT].
47. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 22 (2d ed. 1978).
48. See ALI/UNDITROIT, supra note 46, at 39 (noting the ALI/UNIDROIT Rules of Transnational Civil Procedure were meant to "provid[e] greater detail and illustrat[e] concrete fulfillment of the Principles").
49. See KOTUBY & SOBOTA, supra note 42. Cheng identified eight norms, although those were very
similar those proposed by Kotuby and Sobota. See CHENG, supra note 41, at 257-386 (listing jurisdiction;
power to determine the extent of jurisdiction (competence de la competence); nemo debet essejudex in propria
sua causa; audiatur et alterapars;jura novit curia; proof and burden of proof; the principle of res judicata;
and extinctive prescription); see also id. at 258 (summarizing the principles outlined in the Greco-Bulgarian
Mixed Arbitral Tribunal in the Arakas (The Georgios) Case from 1927).
50. See KOTUBY & SOBOTA, supra note 42, at 158-60.
51. See Solum, supra note 28, at 183.
52. Id.
53. Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 11, at 367.
54. See KOTUBY & SOBOTA, supra note 42, at 165-76.
55. See Joseph R. Brubaker, The Judge Who Knew Too Much: Issue Conflicts in InternationalAdjudication, 26 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 111, 115-16 (2008); Edward Gordon et al., The Independence and Impartiality
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so considered central to the legitimacy of the dispute resolution process.56
Again, the peremptory nature of this principle appears incontrovertible, since
independence and impartiality of decisionmakers is, as Criddle and Fox-Decent
say, "indispensable to the state's ability to secure legality for the benefit of
all." 57
Kotuby and Sobota's third norm involves procedural equality and the
right to be heard. While some commentators have found it difficult to distinguish between these two concepts at the level of individual rules,59 there seems
to be little if any scope for arguing that procedural equality and the right to be
heard in matters determining one's substantive rights are not "indispensable to
the state's ability to secure legality for the benefit of all[]" as a matter of principle.60 As a result, these norms can be said to rise to the level of procedural jus
cogens.
Kotuby and Sobota's fourth principle of international procedural law involves the condemnation of fraud and corruption.61 In some ways, these principles appear to relate more to substantive concerns than procedural issues, given
that many of the examples discussed by Kotuby and Sobota involve the duty of
adjudicators not to give effect to agreements or actions that are fraudulent or
corrupt.62 Still, Kotuby and Sobota may also have been thinking about efforts
to perpetuate a fraud on the judicial process, as in situations where parties or
third parties seek to intimidate the judge.63 While this latter category of concerns appears to be procedural in nature, those matters could just as easily be
included in 6 rovisions regarding the independence and impartiality of decisionmakers. Therefore, it does not appear that concerns about fraud and corruption can or should be characterized as independent jus cogens norms, although further analysis could lead to a contrary conclusion.
The fifth principle discussed by Kotuby and Sobota involves evidence and
burdens of proof.65 While the authors are to be commended for trying to unbundle the constituent elements of procedure, even they recognize that some of
the items under this heading could be subsumed into other categories.66 For example, the failure to allow parties to present evidence could fall within the gen-

oflnternationalJudges, 83 AM. SOCY INT'L L. PROC. 508, 508 (1989); Philippe Sands et al., The Burgh House
Principles on the Independence of the InternationalJudiciary 4 L. & PRAC. INT'L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 247
(2005).
56. See KOTUBY & SOBOTA, supra note 42, at 165-76.
57. Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 11, at 367.
58. See KOTUBY & SOBOTA, supra note 42, at 176-83.
59. See Scott Dodson, The Challenge of Comparative Civil Procedure, 60 ALA. L. REV. 133, 136-37
(2008) (book review).
60. Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 11, at 367.
61. See KOTUBY & SOBOTA, supra note 42, at 183-90.
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., Judges Targeted Fast Facts, CNN (Apr. 18, 2018), http://www.cnn.com/2013/11/04/us/
judges-targeted-fast-facts/ (listing federal judges who have been threated or killed as a result of their work).
64. See KOTUBY & SOBOTA, supra note 42, at 165-76.
65. See id. at 190-96.
66. See id. at 197.
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eral right to be heard, as could concerns about improperly or illegally obtained
evidence.67 Other issues that are discussed by Kotuby and Sobota under this
heading, such as those relating to burdens of production and proof, and matters
involving the weight of evidence, would seem to be better categorized as rules
rather than core principles of procedural justice, given the significant variation
between jurisdictions on how these norms operate.68 Therefore, those issuessuch as the right to present evidence-that fall within other protected categories
could be considered peremptory in nature, whereas those matters-such as
those involving burdens of production and proof that are more akin to rules
would not rise to the level of procedural jus cogens.
Kotuby and Sobota's sixth and final principle involves the concept of res
judicata, meaning that parties are bound by properly rendered judgments,
which precludes claims from being retried a second time by the same court or
tribunal.69 Given other commentary indicating that finality of decisions is
"nonoptional," the notion of res judicata would appear to rise to the level of
proceduraljus cogens.70
IV.

APPLICATION OF PROCEDURAL JUS COGENS TO U.S. IMMIGRATION

DIsPuTs

The next question involves how procedural jus cogens can be used in matters involving U.S. immigration proceedings. Several possibilities exist, including those that can be asserted by individuals and those that can be asserted by
states.
A.

IndividualAssertions ofProceduralJus Cogens

The first way that procedural jus cogens could arise in matters involving
U.S. immigration policy and practice is in national court proceedings. The most
obvious option would be for individuals to assert jus cogens in U.S. court. For
example, if the current Administration carries out its proposal to eliminate immigrants' access to justice, procedural jus cogens-particularly those aspects
that focus on procedural equality and the right to be heard could be asserted in
a constitutional challenge to the implementation of that plan.71
How would such claims be received? At this point, the United States Supreme Court has not decided whether and to what extent jus cogens norms are
applicable to disputes heard in U.S. court.72 A number of circuit courts, however, have relied onjus cogens to hold foreign officials liable for certain actions-

67.
68.
69.
70.
(2016).
71.
72.

See id. at 196.
See id. at 191-95; Strong, supra note 11, at 402-03.
See KOTUBY & SOBOTA, supra note 42, at 197-202.
Kevin M. Clermont, Res Judicata As Requisite for Justice, 68 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 1067, 1082
Rogers & Stolberg, supra note 4.
See Grahamv. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010) (declining to address thejus cogens claim).

280

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2019

typically torture-that violate those norms.73 As a result, it is possible that some
U.S. judges will be receptive to the invocation of procedural jus cogens.
Although the United States is the most logical place to assert a claim relating to deficiencies with U.S. immigration processes, it is not the only possible forum. Because jus cogens is a principle of international law, its application is not limited solely to the place where the wrongdoing occurred. If the
injury in question arose as a matter of international law, then individuals may
be able to assert a claim for damages in another national court.7 5
One possible venue would be the home courts of the immigrant(s) in
question. This option appears particularly appealing if the individual whose
procedural rights were violated had obtained legal residency in the United
States.76 Still, some individuals-such as those who are fleeing persecution or
who come from a country that is not willing to endanger its relationship with
the United States-may not find their national courts very welcoming.
In this latter subset of cases, injured individuals should consider whether
it would be possible to assert their claims in a third nation, based on the concept
of universal jurisdiction.7 7 Universal jurisdiction has been discussed most frequently in the context of criminal actions, but there are those who believe it is
also available in civil disputes involving violations of international law.7 8 Such
a proposition has never been tested in cases involving violations of procedural
jus cogens, but it is theoretically possible.
B.

State Assertions ofProceduralJus Cogens

Although it may be possible for an individual to base a claim in national
court on procedural jus cogens, it is only recently that individuals have been
considered competent to obtain recovery for violations of international law. 79
Traditionally, international law operated only between states, meaning that any
violation of that law was considered injurious only to a state, not an individu-

73. See Yousuf v. Samantar, 699 F.3d 763, 776-77 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing authorities from the Seventh
and Ninth Circuits), cert. denied, 571 U.S. 1156 (2014).
74. See Thomas Giegerich, Do Damages ClaimsArising from Jus Cogens Violations Override State Immunity from the JurisdictionofForeign Courts?, in THE FUNDAMENTAL RULES OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL

ORDER: JUS COGENS AND OBLIGATIONS ERGA- OMNES 203, 203 (Christian Tomuschat & Jean-Marc Thouvenin
eds., 2006).
75. See id.
76. See, e.g., Brittany Meija, It's Not Just People in the U.S. Illegally ICE is Nabbing Lawful PermanentResidents Too, L.A. TIMES (June 28, 2018), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-In-lawful-resident20180628-htmlstory.html; Maria Sacchetti & David Weigel, ICE Has Detained or Deported Prominent Immigration Activists, WASH. POST. (Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.wasingtonpost.com/powerpost/ice-has-detainedor-deported-foreigners-who-are-also-immigration-activists/2018/01/19/377af23a-fc95-1 1e7-a46ba3614530bd87_story.html?noredirect=on&utm term=.84cf6df24242.
77. See Donald Francis Donovan & Anthea Roberts, The Emerging Recognition of Universal Civil Jurisdiction, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 142, 142 (2006).
78. See id.
79. See Lucy Reed, Great Expectations: Where Does the ProliferationofInternationalDispute Resolution TribunalsLeave InternationalLaw?, 96 AM. SocY INT'L L. PROC. 219, 225 (2002).
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al.80 While the historic understanding of international law has shifted somewhat
with respect to individual rights to recovery, the ability of states to enforce
international law remains undiminished. It is therefore useful to consider
whether and to what extent a state could object to possible violations of proceduraljus cogens by the United States.
One possibility is for a state to brin a claim against the United States in
the International Court of Justice ("ICJ"). The Statute of the ICJ respects peremptory norms as a type of binding authority, so there is no difficulty in basing
legal arguments onjus cogens.83 Instead, the problem would involve establishing jurisdiction over the United States for injuries relating to the denial of procedural justice regarding immigrants, since the United States withdrew from
the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ in 1985.84 This is not to say that jurisdiction could not be established, but simply to note that it cannot be assumed.
Although states should first resort to judicial means of enforcing proceduraljus cogens, states are allowed to respond to violations of international law
through certain non-judicial mechanisms known as countermeasures. 85 Countermeasures involve various actions (other than force) that are "unilateral in
character, taken for a coercive purpose by a State (the 'reacting State') in response to an internationally wrongful act committed by the State against whom
the countermeasures are addressed (the 'target State') and which, under normal
circumstances, would themselves be unlawful."86 Countermeasures may be
taken by a state that experiences a direct injury as a result of the violation of
international law-as might be the case with the home state of an immigrant
who was denied procedural justice in U.S. courts-or, in some cases, by third
states. 8 7

The legal literature on countermeasures is extensive and should be consulted before any action is taken. It is enough for current purposes, however,
to note that countermeasures need not be reciprocal in nature (i.e., they need
not relate to the particular harm suffered, so long as the response is proportional) and may be triggered by violations of all types of international law, ranging

80. See id.
81. Seeid.
82. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 1. Only states may be parties in the ICJ. See id.
art. 34.
83. Id. art. 38, ¶1.
84. See Letter from George P. Shultz, Secretary, U.S. Dep't of State, to Dr. Javier Perez de Cuellar, Secretary-General, United Nations (Oct. 7, 1985), citedin Medellinv. Texas, 555 U.S. 491, 500 (2008).
85. See International Law Commission, Responsibility of States for Intentionally Wrongful Acts, arts.
26, 49-54 (2001).
86. N. Jansen Calamita, Countermeasuresand Jurisdiction: Between Effectiveness and Fragmentation,
42 GEO. J. INT'L L. 233, 242 (2011).
87. See International Law Commission, supra note 94, arts. 26, 49-54; Christian Hillgruber, The Right of
Third States to Take Countermeasures, in THE FUNDAMENTAL RULES OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER,

supra note 74, at 265, 265.
88. See Calamita, supra note 86, at 242-44 (discussing authorities).
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from customary international law to treaty law and thereby including jus co89
gens.
V.

CONCLUSION

Since January 2017, the Trump Administration has challenged numerous
legal and constitutional norms and threatened the international legal and political order in several respects. 90 Furthermore, it appears likely that further initiatives, including those involving immigrants' procedural rights, will be advanced in the future. 91
Attacks on immigrants are highly problematic for a number of reasons,
not the least of which is the vulnerability of the immigrant population within
the relevant legal and social structure. Immigrants make a convenient scapegoat
for those seeking to offset blame, and politicians who advance anti-immigration
agendas often find comfort in the belief that such actions are insulated from external review or condemnation. But international law was created precisely in
order to hold both countries and individuals accountable for their improper actions.
International procedural law has long been ignored by both advocates and
scholars, likely because of the perception that procedural law exists merely "to
serve the substantive task." 92 That paradigm, however, is neither accurate nor
wise. Procedural law is inherently and intrinsically valuable to any system of
justice and provides important limitations on state and official behavior. 93 As
this Essay has shown, international procedural law-particularly peremptory
norms known as procedural jus cogens-can be used to counteract improper
violations of immigrants' rights in the United States. While one hopes that such
efforts will not be necessary, history has shown that it is necessary to be prepared for all possible contingencies.

89. See id.
90. See supra notes 1-4, 32 and accompanying text.
91. See David Nakamura, Travel-ban Ruling Could Embolden Trump in Remaking the U.S. Immigration
System, WASH. POST (June 27, 2018), http://www.msn.com/en-us/news/politics/travel-ban-ruling-couldembolden-trump-in-remaking-the-us-immigration-system/ar-AAzdokR?li=BBnbcAl; Rucker & Weigel, supra
note 3.
92. LoUIs L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 567 (1965).
93. See John B. Attanasio, A Duty-OrientedProcedurein a Rights-OrientedSociety, 63 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 597, 605 (1988); Jens David Ohlin, A Meta-Theory oflnternationalCriminalProcedure: Vindicating the
Rule ofLaw, 14 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 77, 82 (2009).

